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DOCTRINE OF STANDING UNDER 
STATUTORY VIOLATIONS 
PRIYA KHANGURA* 
INTRODUCTION 
The meaning of standing is something that divides legal scholars, 
courts, and practitioners. Standing is defined as a “party’s right to 
make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right.”1 In 
federal court, standing refers to satisfying the case or controversy 
requirement under Article III,2 which grants a plaintiff the right to tell 
his story in court. Determining whether a party has Article III 
standing involves a three-step inquiry: first, the petitioner must 
sufficiently allege an injury-in-fact; second, the injury alleged must be 
fairly traceable to the defendant’s actions; and third, a favorable 
ruling by the court must be able to sufficiently redress the plaintiff’s 
alleged injury.3 
The three elements outlined above are the “minimum 
constitutional requirement” for a court to hear a case.4 But over the 
years, courts have expanded the standing inquiry to additional claims, 
distinguished from the above elements by the name “prudential” 
standing.5 Prudential standing developed “to limit the role of courts in 
resolving public disputes.”6 For example, courts will not hear cases by 
plaintiffs asserting a “generalized grievance” whereby the plaintiff’s 
harm is shared “in substantially equal measure” by a class of citizens.7 
Further, even if a plaintiff meets the “case or controversy” 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, Class 2017. 
 1.  Standing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 2.  See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and 
Equity, arising under . . . the Laws of the United States.”). 
 3.  Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000). 
 4.  Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). 
 5.  Id. at 501. 
 6.  Id. at 500. 
 7.  Id. 
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requirement, he must “assert his own legal rights or interests” and 
cannot assert his relief on the rights of third parties.8 Prudential 
standing can be overridden, however, if a court finds “countervailing 
circumstances” or if Congress grants “an express right of action to 
persons who otherwise would be barred.”9 But even if Congress 
expressly affords a right of action, “of course, Art. III’s requirement 
remains.”10 
Standing forms the basis of justiciability. As such, every plaintiff 
must have standing to bring suit in federal court.  Courts, however, 
have struggled over what constitutes an injury-in-fact, often 
considered to be the central inquiry in determining a party’s standing.  
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins11 concerns this inquiry by asking whether a 
violation of a federal statute grants a plaintiff standing to sue.12 By 
granting certiorari, the Court will resolve a circuit split on the 
definition of injury for the purposes of standing, and could potentially 
redefine standing by either opening the door to federal courts (if 
resolving for Robins) or by limiting Congress’s ability to confer 
standing on parties who suffer statutory violations (if resolving for 
Spokeo). 
This Commentary discusses the parties’ arguments and urges the 
Court to settle the issue by finding that a violation of a federal statute 
does grant a plaintiff standing. Congress’s actions in creating the 
violation reflect a legislative intent that such a violation is an injury-
in-fact that can harm a plaintiff and grant him the right to sue in 
federal court.  And because the plaintiff here alleged sufficient injury 
based on the effects of the statutory violation of a procedural right, he 
(as well as others similarly situated) has standing. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Petitioner Spokeo, Inc. operates a website where users can obtain 
a variety of information about individuals.13 The website aggregates 
publicly available information into a searchable database accessible to 
its users and generates a report about an individual upon a search 
 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. at 501. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  No. 13-1339 (U.S. 2015). 
 12.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, No. 13-1339 (U.S. 2015). 
 13.  Brief for Petitioners at 3, Spokeo, No. 13-1339 (U.S. 2015) [hereinafter Brief for 
Petitioner]. 
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query. The report may include information about a person’s age, 
occupation, education, ethnicity, property value, hobbies, phone 
number, marital status, and names of family members, as well as an 
image of his residence.14 
Respondent Thomas Robins’s report was available on Spokeo’s 
website.15 According to Robins, the report contained inaccuracies that 
affected his employability—it stated that he had a graduate degree, 
was employed in a professional or technical field, had very strong 
economic health, was in a high wealth level, was in his 50s, was 
married, and had children.16 All of this information was false.17 Robins 
claimed his employment prospects were negatively affected by this 
false report and that his unemployment was partly Spokeo’s fault.18 
Not only did he lose money from being unemployed, but Robins also 
suffered “anxiety, stress, concern, and/or worry about his diminished 
employment prospects.”19 
Robins brought suit against Spokeo, claiming Spokeo willfully 
violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act20 (“FCRA”).21 He alleged that 
Spokeo created and made available for purchase an inaccurate report 
of his personal information.22 According to Robins, Spokeo was aware 
of the inaccuracies in its processes, which compile reports based on 
publically available information.23 Furthermore, Robins alleged that 
Spokeo does not seek permission from individuals before publishing 
this information.24 He sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and 
statutory damages from Spokeo.25 
Spokeo maintains that its website warns users that “none of the 
information offered by Spokeo is to be considered for purposes of 
determining any entity or person’s eligibility for credit, insurance, 
 
 14.  Brief for Respondent at 7, Spokeo, No. 13-1339 (U.S. 2015) [hereinafter Brief for 
Respondent]. 
 15.  Id. at 9. 
 16.  Id. at 8. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 411 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 1892 
(Apr. 27, 2015) (No. 13-1339). 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006). 
 21.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 14, at 8. 
 22.  Id. at 9. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
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employment, or for any other purposes covered under FCRA.”26 
Before accessing the “Wealth” section of the website—which rates an 
individual’s wealth on a scale from low to high and could include 
information regarding an individual’s employment background, credit 
history, mortgage value, and investments27—users had to agree to this 
disclaimer.28  Robins, however, alleges that Spokeo “markets its 
services to employers who want to evaluate prospective employees.”29 
Moreover, Robins points to “numerous investigative studies,” and a 
statement by Spokeo’s founder to show that Spokeo’s reports often 
contain inaccurate information.30 
The district court first dismissed Robins’s complaint for lack of 
standing—specifically for insufficient injury—and granted him leave 
to amend to address the issue of standing.31 Robins’s Amended 
Complaint additionally alleged that Spokeo’s inaccurate consumer 
reports caused him “actual and/or imminent harm by creating, 
displaying, and marketing inaccurate consumer reporting information 
about [him].”32 Spokeo responded by claiming it is not a consumer 
reporting agency, and thus could not be sued under FCRA.33 Spokeo 
then filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim and lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction.34 
The district court initially denied Spokeo’s Motion to Dismiss35 for 
claims arising under FCRA, finding that Robins had “alleged 
sufficient facts to confer Article III standing.”36 Robins’s injury-in-fact 
was “the marketing of inaccurate consumer reporting information,” 
which “is fairly traceable to [Spokeo’s] conduct,” and “likely to be 
redressed by a favorable decision.”37 Furthermore, Robins’s 
allegations that Spokeo “regularly accepts money in exchange for 
reports that ‘contain data and evaluations regarding consumers’ 
 
 26.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 13, at 4. 
 27.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 14, at 7. 
 28.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 13, at 4; Brief for Respondent, supra note 14, at 7. 
 29.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 14, at 7. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  See Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., No. CV10-05306 ODW (AGRx), 2011 WL 1793334, at *1 
(C.D. Cal. May 11, 2011). 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Robins, 2011 WL 1793334, at *1. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  The district court also granted in part Spokeo’s motion to dismiss on other claims not 
relevant here. 
 36.  Id. at 2. 
 37.  Id. 
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economic wealth and creditworthiness’” sufficed to “support a 
plausible inference that [Spokeo’s] conduct falls within the scope of 
the FCRA.”38 
Subsequently, Spokeo sought certification of an interlocutory 
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).39 After this action, the district court 
issued another order that reconsidered its prior ruling by dismissing 
Robins’s action.40 The court struck its previous standing discussion 
and reinstated its initial Order that found Robins failed to establish 
standing.41 This order found Robins’s alleged harm “speculative, 
attenuated, and implausible.” Furthermore, the court found that a 
“mere violation” of FCRA “does not confer Article III standing, 
where no injury is properly pled.”42 Additionally, the court found 
Robins failed to meet the traceability requirement.43 The district court 
dismissed the case with prejudice.44 
After Robins appealed, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district 
court’s decision by finding that Robins’s alleged FCRA violations met 
Article III standing requirements.45 The court found that Congress 
intended to create a statutory right by creating a private cause of 
action in FCRA, and that the violation of a statutory right usually 
suffices to meet the injury-in-fact element of standing.46 Because 
Robins alleged that his statutory rights were injured, he had a 
sufficiently concrete and particularized injury.47 The court found that 
the other two elements of standing—causation and redressibility—
were met because statutory rights were at issue.48 Once injury-in-fact 
is proven in the context of a statutory right, “causation and 
redressibility will usually be satisfied.”49 
Spokeo then petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, which 
was granted.50 
 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 13, at 6. 
 40.  Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., No. CV10-05306 ODW (AGRx), 2011 WL 11562151, at *1 
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2011). 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 13, at 6. 
 45.  Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 414 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 46.  Id. 412. 
 47.  Id. at 413. 
 48.  Id. at 414. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (2015). 
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II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. Standing 
Standing is an essential element of every federal case. Under 
Article III, federal “judicial power” is limited to resolution of “Cases” 
or “Controversies,”51 so every plaintiff must have standing to bring 
suit in federal court.52 Standing is demonstrated by a three step 
inquiry: first, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury-in-fact that is 
concrete and particularized, and actual or imminent, not conjectural 
or hypothetical; second, the injury must be fairly traceable to the 
challenged action of the defendant; and, third, it must be likely, not 
merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable 
decision.53 
The standing “question” for a court is whether a plaintiff has 
sufficiently alleged a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy 
to allow his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction.54 This justifies the 
use of court resources and remedial powers for his case.55 Standing is a 
version of judicial self-governance and separation of powers that 
ensures courts remain within their constitutionally delegated duties, 
not encroaching on decisions better left to other branches.56 
The source of a plaintiff’s claim is an important part of the 
standing inquiry. For example, if a plaintiff claims injury under a 
statute, courts often ask whether Congress intended for a plaintiff to 
bring suit.57 In many cases, standing has been denied for third-party 
plaintiffs who alleged statutory violations because courts found that 
Congress only intended for those directly affected to bring suit.58 
However, courts have also recognized that Congress has the power to 
grant an express right of action to third-party plaintiffs, as long as they 
meet the irreducible constitutional minimum of alleging an injury-in-
fact.59 
 
 51.  U.S. CONST, art. III, § 2. 
 52.  See Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (“Standing principles delineate 
the ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies’ that are of the justiciable sort referred to in Article III.”). 
 53.  Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. Inc., 528 U.S. 168, 180–81 (2000). 
 54.  Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. at 500. 
 58.  Id. at 501. 
 59.  Id. 
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B.  The Statute 
This case arises under FCRA,60 which obligates consumer 
reporting agencies to comply with specific statutory guidelines in 
transmitting consumer information. The goal of FCRA was “to 
prevent consumers from being unjustly damaged because of 
inaccurate or arbitrary information,” and “to prevent an undue 
invasion of the individual’s right of privacy in the collection and 
distribution of credit information.”61 
Under FCRA, a “consumer reporting agency” is “any person 
which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, 
regularly engages . . . in the practice of assembling or evaluating 
consumer credit information or other information on consumers for 
the purposes of furnishing consumer reports to third parties.”62 A 
consumer report is “any written, oral, or other communication of any 
information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s 
credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general 
reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living” generated to 
establish the consumer’s eligibility for certain purposes,63 including 
“employment purposes.”64 Among other requirements, consumer 
reporting agencies must “follow reasonable procedures to assure 
maximum possible accuracy of consumer reports.”65 
The statute distinguishes between two types of violations: 
negligent and willful.66 For a negligent violation, consumer reporting 
agencies must pay actual damages, attorney’s fees, and costs.67 For a 
willful violation, the harmed consumer is given a choice: the greater of 
actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the failure 
between $100 and $1000 or statutory damages between $100 and 
$1000 for a person obtaining a report under false pretenses.68 For 
willful violations, consumers may also seek punitive damages.69 
 
 60.  15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006). 
 61.  S. REP. NO. 91-517, at 1 (1969). 
 62.  15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f). 
 63.  Id. § 1681a(d)(1). 
 64.  Id. § 1681a(d)(1)(B). 
 65.  Id. § 1681e(b). 
 66.  See id. §§ 1681n–o. 
 67.  Id. § 1681o(a). 
 68.  Id. § 1681n(a)(1). 
 69.  Id. § 1681n(a)(2). 
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C.  The Circuit Split 
Circuits are currently divided on whether a statutory violation 
grants a plaintiff standing to sue. The Ninth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits 
agree that a statutory violation may grant standing, but the Second 
and Fourth Circuits have ruled the other way. In this case, the Ninth 
Circuit found that Robins’s claim under FCRA sufficed to establish 
an injury-in-fact and granted him standing. Previously, the Sixth 
Circuit found a plaintiff bringing a class action claim under FCRA 
had standing based on an inaccurate consumer report generated by a 
credit reporting agency.70 Likewise, the Eighth Circuit recently found 
that customers had standing to bring a class action against a wholesale 
retailer under the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act.71 
On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit found that individuals 
bringing a class action under the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (“ERISA”) failed to meet the injury-in-fact requirement 
to establish standing.72 Similarly, in an earlier ERISA case, the Second 
Circuit found a plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the defendants’ 
action.73 
The Ninth Circuit followed the approach of the Sixth and Eighth 
Circuits by finding that a statutory violation provided a basis for an 
injury-in-fact to meet constitutional standing requirements.74 
III.  HOLDING 
A.  Injury-in-Fact 
The Ninth Circuit held Robins’s alleged injury sufficed to grant 
him standing.75 This holding rested on two main considerations: the 
statute’s text regarding the requirements to allege a violation76 and 
the fact that Robins’s injuries were individual and concrete.77 In 
reviewing circuit precedent, the court noted that “Congress’s creation 
of a private cause of action to enforce a statutory provision implies 
that Congress intended the enforceable provision to create a statutory 
 
 70.  Beaudry v. TeleCheck Servs., Inc., 559 F.3d 702, 705 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 71.  Hammer v. Sam’s East, Inc., 754 F.3d 492, 498 (8th Cir. 2014). 
 72.  David v. Alphin, 704 F.3d 327, 334 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 73.  Kendall v. Emp. Ret. Plan of Avon Prod., 561 F.3d 112, 123 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 74.  See infra Section III. 
 75.  Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 414 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 76.  Id. at 412–13. 
 77.  Id. at 413. 
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right.”78 Furthermore, the court stated that “the violation of a 
statutory right is usually a sufficient injury in fact to confer 
standing.”79 Against this backdrop, the court examined FCRA’s text 
defining when a statutory violation occurs.80 Because FCRA does not 
require a showing of actual harm when a plaintiff sues for violations, 
the court found that proof of actual damages was unnecessary in the 
standing inquiry.81 The court was guided by the statutory text because 
“the scope of the cause of action determines the scope of the implied 
statutory right.”82 Thus, Robins’s claim fit FCRA’s requirements for 
alleging a statutory violation, which the court found sufficed for an 
injury-in-fact.83 
The court then addressed congressional standing inquiring as to 
“whether violations of statutory rights created by the FCRA are 
‘concrete, de facto injuries’ that Congress can . . . elevate” to the status 
of legally cognizable injury.84 The court looked to the Sixth Circuit’s 
analysis in Beaudry v. TeleCheck Services, Inc.85 as a guide, and found 
that because Robins was among the injured and the statutory right at 
issue protected against individual harm, Robins’s injury was concrete 
and legally cognizable.86 
B.  Causation and Redressability 
The Ninth Circuit also found that Robins fulfilled the remaining 
standing elements: causation and redressability.87 Looking at 
precedent, the Ninth Circuit found that “[w]here statutory rights are 
asserted, . . . [its] cases have described the standing inquiry as boiling 
down to ‘essentially’ the injury-in-fact prong.” Because the injury 
could be traced to the violation of a statutory right, such a violation of 
a statutor right caused that injury.88 Furthermore, by providing 
damages in the statute for the violation, redressability was fulfilled.89 
 
 78.  Id. at 412. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. at 412–13. 
 82.  Id. at 413. 
 83.  Id. at 413–14. 
 84.  Id. (applying Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)). 
 85.  559 F.3d 702, 705 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. at 414. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. 
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Thus, the last two elements of standing were easily met in the court’s 
eyes. 
IV.  ARGUMENTS 
A.  Spokeo’s Arguments 
Spokeo argues that Robins’s claim under FCRA is insufficient to 
meet the injury-in-fact requirement of standing.90 Its argument is 
three-fold: first, Congress may not “override” the minimum injury 
requirement of Article III; second, the constitutional minimum 
requires “actual or imminent concrete harm”; and third, Robins has 
not shown a concrete harm.91 To show a concrete harm under FCRA, 
Robins would need to allege additional facts, such as suffering 
additional pecuniary or other harm beyond the statutory violation.92 
Looking at precedent, Spokeo first argues that Congress may not 
override the minimum Article III standing requirements of injury-in 
fact, causation, and redressability because these are constitutionally 
derived.93 But because prudential standing elements are judicially 
created, they may be overridden if Congress creates a statutory right 
that allows third parties to bring claims.94 And Spokeo argues that 
Congress’s ability to override prudential standing stands “only for the 
proposition that Congress ‘may elevat[e] to the status of legally 
cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously 
inadequate in law.’”95  Thus, Spokeo distinguishes between “injury in 
fact” and “injury in law” to support its claim that Congress may only 
create an “injury in law,” or legal right, which forms the foundation for 
an injury-in-fact.96 Plaintiffs seeking justiciability, therefore, may use 
the Congressionally created legal right to show an injury-in-fact under 
Article III, but Congress cannot statutorily create or define an injury-
in-fact. 97 
To support its limitation on Congress’s ability to define an injury-
in-fact, Spokeo then looks to the Constitution’s text and history.98 
 
 90.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 13, at 11. 
 91.  Id. at 12. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. at 13. 
 95.  Id. at 14 (quoting Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 560, 578 (1992)). 
 96.  Id. at 15. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. at 18. 
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Because the Framers drafted Article III to narrowly confine the scope 
of judicial authority, properly applied, standing is only conferred on 
“matters familiar to the Framers as disputes appropriate for 
resolution in court,” deemed “legal wrongs.”99 All legal wrongs in the 
English tradition “involved the infliction of concrete harm on a 
person or property.”100 Spokeo looks to this history for the proposition 
that such concrete harm “was a prerequisite” to bring a claim in 
court.101  Further, following separation-of-powers principles, Spokeo 
asserts that only the judiciary can recognize an injury-in-fact once 
private parties have demonstrated a concrete harm that exists beyond 
a statutory violation.102 In other words, private individuals cannot 
enter courts without alleging a concrete harm, even if they have 
suffered a statutory violation.103 Without this limitation, Congress 
would usurp the judiciary’s role.104 
Lastly, Spokeo proposes that Robins failed to allege a concrete 
harm, even though FCRA was violated.105 This argument is four-fold. 
First, because FCRA does not require proof of actual or imminent 
concrete harm as an element of the legal violation, the Court cannot 
rely on the statutory violation alone to grant Robins standing.106 
Second, FCRA’s right to recover damages does not meet the concrete 
harm threshold.107 Third, FCRA’s legal violations are not grounded in 
common law claims, such as defamation, to allow Congress to create 
injury-in-fact here.108 Fourth, the publishing of inaccurate information 
did not inflict concrete harm on Robins to meet the injury-in-fact 
threshold based on the district court’s determination.109 For Robins’s 
claim to proceed as it stands, FCRA would need to contain a clear 
statement of intent “to abrogate the concrete harm requirement.”110 
 
 99.  Id. at 20, 22. 
 100.  Id. at 22. 
 101.  Id. at 28. 
 102.  Id. at 27. 
 103.  Id. at 28. 
 104.  Id. at 36. 
 105.  Id. at 24. 
 106.  Id. at 37–38. 
 107.  Id. at 47. 
 108.  Id. at 49–50. 
 109.  Id. at 52–53. 
 110.  Id. at 55. 
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B.  Robins’s Claims 
Robins claims that the private right of action he commenced to 
seek the statutory damages remedy that Congress provided in FCRA 
meets Article III’s requirements.111 As Spokeo does, Robins cites 
common law, Supreme Court precedent, and separation-of-powers 
principles as support for his argument.112 According to Robins, the 
injury requirement of Article III may exist solely from a statute.113 
This finds its roots in common law from the fourteenth century and 
early Supreme Court decisions.114 Because Congress had historically 
provided statutory damages to ensure that legal rights can be 
remedied in court, allowing a statutory violation under FCRA to be 
adjudicated in federal court follows Congress’s intent, according to 
Robins.115 
Robins claimed that consequential harm has not been required to 
establish standing.116 He cites early cases where courts recognized that 
an invasion of a legal right sufficed to grant standing, without any 
further showing of harm required.117 Even if a statute only grants an 
injured party nominal damages, the injured party may still bring an 
action in court to recover these damages.118 Further, Robins alleges 
that Congress often grants statutory damages as a means to redress a 
legal injury, and consequential harm was not necessary in each case 
for statutory damages.119 Given this well-established tradition of 
redressing invasions of legal rights, Robins claims that allowing his 
action satisfies Article III.120 
 
 111.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 13, at 10. 
 112.  Id. at 11. 
 113.  Id. at 15–16. 
 114.  Id. at 16–17. For example, Robins cites an early assault case in which the defendant 
swung a hatchet at a woman but missed, with no physical harm caused. This “inchoate” violence 
was redressable and conferred standing. Battery, trespass, and slander are also cited as examples 
of cases of actions being maintained without requiring a showing of real-world damage or actual 
harm. 
 115.  Id. at 17. 
 116.  Id. at 13. 
 117.  Id. at 13–14. 
 118.  Id. at 14. 
 119.  Id. at 21–22. Here, Robins cites the Restatement (Second) of Torts for cases involving 
property rights and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts for cases involving breach of 
contract where “invasions of legal rights” are redressed by “nominal damages.” And Robins 
cites a copyright case from 1790 where damages were granted absent consequential harm. 
 120.  Id. at 13. 
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V.  ANALYSIS 
The Court should find in favor of Robins. First, Robins’s claim 
under FCRA is personal and particularized to establish concrete 
harm. Second, separation-of-powers concerns are not implicated 
when Congress grants a party the right to sue for a statutory violation. 
And, unlike Spokeo’s claim, precedent favors granting Robins the 
right to sue here because he meets the irreducible minimum of Article 
III standing. 
Robins’s claim meets the injury-in-fact requirement. As noted 
above, an injury is “an invasion of a legally protected interest.”121 
Congress may define an injury by enacting a statute, which defines a 
legally protected interest.122 Even when Congress defines an injury, a 
plaintiff “must allege a distinct and palpable injury to himself, even if 
it is an injury shared by a large class of other possible litigants.”123 
Thus, a plaintiff may first cite a statutory violation, but then must also 
show how that violation affected him personally in order to meet the 
injury-in-fact requirement. For example, the Court has found that if 
Congress has designated an act as permissive under a statute and a 
plaintiff can show a denial of access, the plaintiff suffers an injury-in-
fact. In Public Citizen v. United States Department of Justice, the Court 
noted that the Federal Advisory Committee Act expressly allows 
individuals to submit requests for information and agency records.124 
A denial of such a request “constitutes a sufficiently distinct injury to 
provide standing to sue.”125 The Court based this decision on previous 
decisions evaluating requests under the Freedom of Information Act, 
and found “no reason for a different rule” under a different statute.126 
Here, Robins fulfilled both prongs of this two-step injury analysis. 
First, he claimed a violation of FCRA because inaccurate information 
about him was posted on Spokeo. Alone, this injury would not be 
enough—the mere presence of inaccurate information does not harm 
someone. But the effects of the inaccurate information led Robins’s 
claim to suffice as injury-in-fact. Robins suffered from the inaccurate 
information because it negatively affected his employment prospects, 
 
 121.  Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
 122.  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007) (quoting Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 
580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). 
 123.  Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). 
 124.  Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989). 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  See id. (listing cases). 
KHANGURA FINAL READ (DO NOT DELETE) 1/26/2016  5:00 PM 
54 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 11 
which necessarily constitutes a concrete, particularized injury under 
FCRA. And Robins sought more than statutory damages for this 
statutory violation—he also sought injunctive and declaratory relief. 
Coupled together, his harm could be remedied—if the inaccurate 
information about him was no longer on Spokeo, then his 
employment prospects might change. Therefore, Robins’s injury 
suffices as an injury-in-fact. 
Second, separation-of-powers concerns are not implicated by 
affording plaintiffs the ability to bring suit when Congress defines a 
statutory violation. The core concern with the standing doctrine, as 
noted above, is to prevent courts from overstepping their bounds into 
areas distinctly reserved to other branches of government. But when 
Congress directly expresses its intent for the judiciary to play a role in 
resolving statutory violations, the concern about judicial overreaching 
no longer exists. By enacting FCRA with specific provisions defining 
statutory violations—including assigning punitive damages, which 
courts can uniquely assess and demand—Congress empowered the 
judiciary to step into this sphere. When Congress intends to preclude 
judicial review, this is made clear in the statutory language.127 
However, FCRA does not prohibit judicial review. In fact, by keeping 
the statutory damages provision unfixed and allowing punitive 
damages to be assessed to statutory violators, it seems more likely 
that Congress sought judicial review to determine how much damage 
an individual plaintiff may be entitled to, depending on the nature of 
the violation. 
Furthermore, Congress has brought courts in to resolve such 
disputes before, and it is not a stretch to think that it is acting similarly 
now. For example, Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman addressed an 
alleged violation under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) based on racial 
steering practices.128 Because the Court recognized that “‘Congress 
intended standing under Section 812 [of the FHA] to extend to the 
full limits of Art. III,’” all the plaintiffs needed to show was an injury-
in-fact.129 It was clear that Congress intended parties to have the 
ability to bring suit under the FHA, even though such a suit would not 
 
 127.  See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (“This chapter applies, according to the provisions thereof, 
except to the extent that—(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is 
committed to agency discretion by law.”). 
 128.  Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982). 
 129.  Id. 
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be possible without the statutory provision.130 In allowing the parties 
to bring suit, the Court recognized that the statutory violation could 
indeed meet the injury-in-fact requirement as long as the plaintiff 
suffered a distinct and palpable injury.131 Therefore, allowing a court to 
resolve injuries alleged under a statute does not implicate separation-
of-powers concerns because Congress, in defining statutory violations, 
clearly intended for a court to resolve these violations. 
Thus, Robins seems to have the better argument. By including a 
statutory provision outlining a statutory violation, has allowed 
aggrieved parties to challenge violators’ practices through the Act. To 
resolve such an alleged violation, it is likely that a court battle will 
ensue. The inquiry should focus on the extent of harm and the 
potential restitution a court may grant an injured party. Even though 
the minimal penalty may deter most individuals from filing suit, a 
class action is the exact vehicle to channel such a suit if the violator 
has caused large-scale harm. Without such actions, companies may 
continue to violate FCRA, which implicates important privacy 
concerns, by producing inaccurate data in an increasingly online 
world. The doctrine of standing should not stand in the way of 
meeting Congress’s goal to improve the quality of online data. 
Because Robins was harmed by Spokeo’s act of making inaccurate 
data about him readily available, he should be able to bring an action 
in court to address these violations. The statute allows for it, and he 
was personally injured. Therefore, the Supreme Court should affirm 
the Ninth Circuit’s holding and find that Robins’s injury was sufficient 
to establish standing. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Robins alleged a concrete, individualized injury caused 
by Spokeo that can be adequately redressed in a court action, the 
Supreme Court should affirm the Ninth Circuit’s ruling for Robins. 
Such a finding is well in line with previous Court decisions finding 
standing for plaintiffs who allege statutory violations, and is consistent 
with fundamental principles outlining the accessibility of courts—
when an individual suffers an injury caused by the actions of another 
party, the court acts as an open door to adjudicate such claims. 
Finding for Robins simply affirms this basic principle without 
 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. 
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corrupting the doctrine of standing. Robins should be afforded his day 
in court. 
